Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS)

MERS is claimed to be a privately-held company that controls a confidential electronic registry designed to track mortgages and the changes in servicing rights and ownership of mortgage loans in the United States.

Shareholders and owners of MERS read like a who's who of failed mortgage and financial companies and include AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, WAMU, CitiMortgage, Countrywide, GMAC, Guaranty Bank, and Merrill Lynch.
It is argued that the U.S. government may currently control MERS via its control and ownership of many of these MERS' shareholders.

On August 28, 2009, the Kansas Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling regarding the standing, rights and interests of MERS in Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 2009 Kan. LEXIS 834 (Aug 28, 2009). The court followed the path of the note and the arguments than have been espoused by national consumer advocates such as April Charney, Max Gardner, Nye Lavalle, Chris Hoyer, and Neal Garfield that all indispensable parties must be identified and that the actual lender identified in foreclosure actions to protect each party's rights. The decision also addressed the role MERS plays in providing an opaque veil that clouds not only the actual real ownership of the promissory note, but title to the property.

In Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, MERS was the appellant who sought to invoke due process rights which it said were violated when MERS failed to get notice of the fact that their “interest” was being wiped out via a prior foreclosure it did not receive notice of. The Court said simply that MERS — or any nominee” didn’t have any interest and proves its point by reference to simple statements in the documents and the simplest of laws and interpretation of the role of MERS and the requirements of recordation. The splitting or bifurcation of the promissory note or mortgage note and mortgage or deed of trust creates an immediate and fatal flaw in title.

The Kansas Supreme Court went on to cite several other case across the nation and stated: “When the role of a servicing agent [MERS] acting on behalf of a mortgagee is thrown into the mix, it is no wonder that it is often difficult for unsophisticated borrowers to be certain of the identity of their lenders and mortgagees.” In re Schwartz, 366 B.R. 265, 266 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) and then cited the Supreme Court of New York (Kings County) that said: “[T]he practices of the various MERS members, including both [the original lender] and [the mortgage purchaser], in obscuring from the public the actual ownership of a mortgage, thereby creating the opportunity for substantial abuses and prejudice to mortgagors . . . , should not be permitted to insulate [the mortgage purchaser] from the consequences of its actions in accepting a mortgage from [the original lender] that was already the subject of litigation in which [the original lender] erroneously represented that it had authority to act as mortgagee.” Johnson, 2008 WL 4182397, at *4, 873 N.Y.S.2d 234 (2008).

The court viewed MERS as simply a "straw man" when it stated: "The relationship that MERS has to (to holder of a loan) is more akin to that of a straw man than to a party possessing all the rights given a buyer. A mortgagee and a lender have intertwined rights that defy a clear separation of interests, especially when such a purported separation relies on ambiguous contractual language. The law generally understands that a mortgagee is not distinct from a lender: a mortgagee is “[o]ne to whom property is mortgaged: the mortgage creditor, or lender.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1034 (8th ed. 2004). By statute, assignment of the mortgage carries with it the assignment of the debt. K.S.A. 58-2323. Although MERS asserts that, under some situations, the mortgage document purports to give it the same rights as the lender, the document consistently refers only to rights of the lender, including rights to receive notice of litigation, to collect payments, and to enforce the debt obligation. The document consistently limits MERS to acting “solely” as the nominee of the lender."

The Missouri court found that, because MERS was not the original holder of the promissory note and because the record contained no evidence that the original holder of the note authorized MERS to transfer the note, the language of the assignment purporting to transfer the promissory note was ineffective. "MERS never held the promissory note, thus its assignment of the deed of trust to Ocwen separate from the note had no force." 284 S.W.3d at 624; see also In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (standard mortgage note language does not expressly or implicitly authorize MERS to transfer the note); In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 517 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) ("[I]f FHM has transferred the note, MERS is no longer an authorized agent of the holder unless it has a separate agency contract with the new undisclosed principal. MERS presents no evidence as to who owns the note, or of any authorization to act on behalf of the present owner."); Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Hillery, 2008 WL 5170180 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (unpublished opinion) ("[F]or there to be a valid assignment, there must be more than just assignment of the deed alone; the note must also be assigned. . . . MERS purportedly assigned both the deed of trust and the promissory note. . . . However, there is no evidence of record that establishes that MERS either held the promissory note or was given the authority . . . to assign the note.").

The Court challenged MERS standing in any foreclosure action when it stated: "What stake in the outcome of an independent action for foreclosure could MERS have? It did not lend the money to Kesler or to anyone else involved in this case. Neither Kesler nor anyone else involved in the case was required by statute or contract to pay money to MERS on the mortgage. [citation omitted](”MERS is not an economic ‘beneficiary’ under the Deed of Trust. It is owed and will collect no money from Debtors under the Note, nor will it realize the value of the Property through foreclosure of the Deed of Trust in the event the Note is not paid.”). If MERS is only the mortgagee, without ownership of the mortgage instrument, it does not have an enforceable right."

"The mortgage instrument states that MERS functions "solely as nominee" for the lender and lender's successors and assigns. The word "nominee" is defined nowhere in the mortgage document, and the functional relationship between MERS and the lender is likewise not defined. In the absence of a contractual definition, the parties leave the definition to judicial interpretation. What meaning is this court to attach to MERS's designation as nominee for Millennia? The parties appear to have defined the word in much the same way that the blind men of Indian legend described an elephant—their description depended on which part they were touching at any given time. Counsel for Sovereign stated to the trial court that MERS holds the mortgage "in street name, if you will, and our client the bank and other banks transfer these mortgages and rely on MERS to provide them with notice of foreclosures and what not." He later stated that the nominee "is the mortgagee and is holding that mortgage for somebody else." At another time he declared on the record that the nominee "is more like a trustee or more like a corporation, a trustee that has multiple beneficiaries. Now a nominee's relationship is not a trust but if you have multiple beneficiaries you don't serve one of the beneficiaries you serve the trustee of the trust. You serve the agent of the corporation."

In the end, the court summarized that MERS had no standing or right to assert a claim when it stated: "MERS's contention that it was deprived of due process in violation of constitutional protections runs aground in the shallows of its property interest. As noted in the discussion of the first issue above, MERS did not demonstrate, in fact, did not attempt to demonstrate, that it possessed any tangible interest in the mortgage beyond a nominal designation as the mortgagor. It lent no money and received no payments from the borrower. It suffered no direct, ascertainable monetary loss as a consequence of the litigation. Having suffered no injury, it does not qualify for protection under the Due Process Clause of either the United States or the Kansas Constitutions."

This case has major reverberations in that as Judge Gordon stated in the case cited above, if it was ever determined that MERS never had a right or standing to bring about a foreclosure action. Judge Gordon stated: I'm not certain with the satisfaction of mortgages that have been filed on behalf of MERS how good those are and I am not certain how good title to property is that people bought at these foreclosure sales if it turns or becomes established that MERS was indeed not only not the right party but misrepresented by way of their pleadings and affidavits that they held something they didn't own, so I'm not certain of the consequences but it seems vast."

Source: Wikipedia